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from numerous U.S. and international
figures who have played prominent
roles in Afghanistan since before and
after 9/11. In fact, Jones’s many cita-
tions and his approach of listing diverse
players with one-line, anecdotal physi-
cal descriptions or personality traits can
be overwhelming and even detract from
the narrative.
Nonetheless, this book does a superb
job of filling in the details of Afghani-
stan’s complex politics for scholars who
are interested in gaining a better under-
standing of the history, the state and
nonstate actors involved, and the many
civil and military leaders who have at-
tempted to calm the political upheaval
in Afghanistan. Jones ably explains
how, after the United States and its al-
lies quickly knocked the Taliban from
power, routed al-Qa‘ida, and set up a
popularly elected central government,
the country nonetheless failed to estab-
lish an adequate justice system and se-
curity for its populace—instead
allowing a robust insurgency to de-
velop. With the experience of someone
who has walked the ground and talked
to the leaders on all sides, Jones effec-
tively argues that the drug trade, high-
level government corruption, and the
lack of resources could, if not resolved,
lead to one more headstone in Afghani-
stan’s graveyard.
DOUGLAS J. WADSWORTH
Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps
Naval War College
Zatarain, Lee Allen. Tanker War: America’s First
Conflict with Iran, 1987–1988. Philadelphia:
Casemate, 2008. 388pp. $32.95
Lee Zatarain, an attorney, has crafted a
compelling and immensely readable ac-
count of one of the least-known chapters
of the U.S. Navy’s maritime combat op-
erations, the tanker war of 1987–88. The
tanker war was fought by three now very
familiar foes—Iran and Iraq (who had
been at war with each other since 1980),
and the United States, which became
embroiled in the conflict when an Iraqi
aircraft attacked and nearly sank one of
its frontline warships in 1987. Using new
information gained from the U.S. Navy
and other U.S. government sources, as
well as extensive interviews with the offi-
cers and crew who served in the Persian
Gulf during the fifteen-month war,
Zatarain examines and explains with
lawyerly precision the events that consti-
tuted the U.S. Navy’s combat operations
against Iranian naval forces.
Tanker War begins with a detailed ac-
count of the Iraqi attack on the guided-
missile frigate USS Stark in May 1987;
the first successful antiship-missile at-
tack on a U.S. Navy warship, it resulted
in thirty-seven deaths. That attack,
however, precipitated no military re-
sponse against Iraq by the United
States, largely because it was considered
to have been an unfortunate accident,
and Iraq was more of a friend than Iran.
Iran’s subsequent actions—laying
mines in the heavily trafficked channels
of the Gulf to interrupt the flow of Iraqi
oil and attacking civilian oil tankers—
forced the United States to side with
Iraq. As Zatarain explains in straight-
forward fashion, the conflict that en-
sued nearly cost the U.S. Navy another
warship, USS Samuel B. Roberts, and
subjected the Navy to several antiship-
missile attacks by the Iranian military.
In retaliation, the U.S. Navy destroyed a
good part of the Iranian navy and
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effectively established the American
maritime dominance in the Persian
Gulf that exists to this day.
Among the key issues that Zatarain
raises in his gripping account of the
various battles fought between the
United States and Iran is the controver-
sial claim by many U.S. Navy com-
manding officers that Iran used
Chinese-made Silkworm antiship mis-
siles against American ships. Their
claims were discounted by senior mili-
tary commanders, who refused to ac-
knowledge that any such attacks had
occurred, despite extensive evidence to
the contrary—such attacks would have
required a military response that the
United States and the U.S. military were
neither willing nor able to undertake.
As political tensions have continued to
rise in recent years between the United
States and Iran, Tanker War is a must-
read for those who have a desire or a
duty to understand how recent history
may shape perceptions of these protag-
onists in the future.
RON RATCLIFF
Naval War College
Graham, Bradley. By His Own Rules: The Ambi-
tions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald
Rumsfeld. New York: PublicAffairs, 2009. 803pp.
$35
In a speech given to Pentagon employees
on 10 September 2001, Secretary of De-
fense Donald Rumsfeld stated that the
“adversary that poses a threat, a serious
threat, to the security of the United
States” is not “decrepit dictators” but
rather “the Pentagon bureaucracy.” The
blunt message of this speech was very
soon to be bound together in a tension-
filled relationship with the ensuing wars
initiated by the terrorist attacks of the
next day. This tension gives dramatic
shape to the career of Donald Rumsfeld
as portrayed by Bradley Graham in his
well researched book By His Own Rules.
A veteran Washington Post correspon-
dent, Graham intends that the title be re-
garded literally, as his detailed story
focuses on Rumsfeld as a master bureau-
cratic infighter who did indeed work by
his own rules. (The rules encapsulated
Rumsfeld’s views on serving and surviv-
ing in government and were eventually
printed in the Wall Street Journal.)
Rumsfeld applied the rules in his in-
tense commitment to the type of U.S.
military President George W. Bush had
called for during his campaign, an “ag-
ile, lethal, readily deployable” armed
force. To build this force required a sig-
nificant transformation of the outsized
and ponderous military developed dur-
ing and immediately after the Cold
War. Graham portrays Rumsfeld as a
reformer who “had never met an orga-
nization he didn’t want to change” and
who had come well prepared to trans-
form the Defense Department, but for
two untimely wars.
Rumsfeld’s personal goal of transform-
ing the military seemed to overshadow
his responsibilities for prosecuting the
wars. Graham describes at length how
Rumsfeld’s missteps in managing the
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused
him to become the “personification of
the arrogance and misjudgments of the
Bush Administration,” from damaging
interagency power struggles to intoler-
ance of differing viewpoints, to a lack of
ability to acknowledge mistakes or
change strategies.
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